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This paper examines how money demand induced real balance
effects contribute to the determination of the price level, as sug-
gested by Patinkin (1949,1965), and if they affect conditions for
local equilibrium uniqueness and stability. There exists a unique
price level sequence that is consistent with an equilibrium under
interest rate policy, only if beginning-of-period money enters the
utility function. Real money can then serve as a state variable,
implying that interest rate setting must be passive for unique,
stable, and non-oscillatory equilibrium sequences. When end-of-
period money provides utility, an equilibrium is consistent with
infinitely many price level sequences, and equilibrium uniqueness
requires an active interest rate setting. The stability results are,
in general, independent of the magnitude of real balance effects,
and apply also when prices are sticky. In contrast, under a con-
stant money growth policy, equilibrium sequences are (likely to
be) locally stable and unique for all model variants.
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Non-technical summary
Money demand does not play a prominent role in recent studies on monetary policy. Typically,
monetary aggregates considered in a way that makes the demand for money de facto irrelevant
for the determination of macroeconomic aggregates when the central bank realizes certain
interest rate targets. This has even led to the theoretical concept of economies being cashless
in the limit, which facilitates an analysis of interest rate policy where monetary aggregates
can be neglected.
In this paper, we examine whether money demand is indeed negligible for the short-run
behavior of macroeconomic aggregates and for monetary policy. The main conclusion is that
money demand matters for the design of a stabilizing monetary policy if the outstanding
stock of money effectively restricts households’ consumption decisions. The price level can
then be non-neutral with regard to real activity and the inflation rate, that is, the classical
dichotomy fails and purely nominal changes have real effects. In this case, a central bank
should only moderately adjust its interest rate target in response to changes in the state of
the economy. The reason is that interest rate changes do not only affect households’ savings
and consumption expenditures due to their willingness to smooth their consumption stream,
but also due to changes in money holdings that become more costly under high interest
rates. In contrast, the current consensus view on stabilizing interest rate policy disregards
the latter effect and calls for interest rates to be adjusted highly reactive (actively) to changes
in inflation.
A consequence of money holdings being essential for households’ goods market transac-
tions is that strong interest rate adjustments can destabilize the economy, i.e., can lead to
unstable output dynamics and to hyperinflations. Such destabilizing effects can be triggered
off by fundamental disturbances, and do therefore not rely on origins of fluctuations that
are speculative in nature, as suggested in various related studies (emphasizing the danger of
inappropriate policy responses to shifts in expectations). Given that the particular relation
between money holdings and household transactions is decisive for the impact of monetary
policy, there is no general principle for the design of interest rate targets that stabilize the
economy under different specifications of money demand. Instead, the only robust stabilizing
device to abandon unstable macroeconomic outcomes is a regime switch, from an interest
rate policy to a regime that controls the supply of money by holding the growth rate of
nominal balances constant. In this case, monetary policy has a non-destabilizing impact on
the economy regardless whether the stock of money is essential for current consumption or
not.
The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model, where money enters a
non-separable utility function and prices are either perfectly or imperfectly flexible. Then,
households’ behavior is influenced by real balance effects, which typically arise when trans-
action frictions are modeled in explicit way, for example in form of shopping time or real
resource costs. We apply two different assumptions about the particular stock of money that
enters the utility function, either the stock of money held at the beginning or at the end of
the period. The former assumption corresponds the idea that the goods market opens before
the asset market. The second assumption can be interpreted as a shortcut for a specification
where households can always adjust their money holdings in accordance with their current
transactions. Thus, both versions substantially differ with regard to the role of money held
by households at the beginning of each period. In the former version, beginning-of-period
real balances restrict households’ current consumption expenditures. In the latter version,
households adjust their end-of-period money holdings in accordance with their current con-
sumption expenditures. Hence, beginning-of-period real balances are then determined by the
previous period consumption decision such that the causality is reversed.
Throughout the paper we focus on the role of money demand and monetary policy rules for
the determination of locally stable equilibrium sequences at the steady state. We show that
the existence (not the magnitude) of real balance effects contribute to price level determinacy,
as for example suggested by Patinkin (1965), if the stock of money held at the beginning of the
period rather than held at the end of the period is assumed to provide transaction services.
Then, there exists a unique initial price level that is consistent with a rational expectations
equilibrium. Whenever the price level can uniquely be determined, real money serves as a
relevant state variable, since money that has been acquired in the previous period relates to
households’ current consumption expenditures.
These properties, which have until now been ignored in the literature, crucially affect
the conditions that ensure macroeconomic stability under interest rate feedback rules when
prices are flexible or sticky. Then, the nominal interest rate should be adjusted by less
than one for one with inflation (passively) to ensure unique and locally stable equilibrium
sequences. If, however, consumption relates to the end-of-period stock of money, then the
equilibrium displays price level indeterminacy. In this case, the conditions for uniqueness
and stability of equilibrium sequences correspond to the so-called “Taylor-principle” that
applies to cashless economies. While the stability conditions for an interest rate policy regime
are highly sensitive, local stability and uniqueness of equilibrium sequences are likely to be
ensured under a policy regime that keeps the growth rate of nominal balances constant. This
result therefore indicates that under non-negligible transaction frictions the central bank
should rather control the supply of money than the nominal interest rate to avoid unstable
macroeconomic dynamics. Nonetheless, an optimal conduct of monetary policy will certainly
require the supply of money to respond to the state of the economy. We plan to investigate
such contingent money supply policies in future work.
1 Introduction
The conduct of monetary policy is known to affect the determination of the price level and,
under non-neutrality, the real equilibrium allocation. Recent studies to this line of research,
mainly focus on policy regimes summarized by interest rate feedback rules, such as Benhabib
et al. (2001a, 2001b, 2003) or Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001),4 while previous contributions
to this literature have primarily considered monetary policy regimes that are characterized
by constant money growth (see, e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1983, Matsuyama, 1990, 1991,
or Matheny, 1998). Correspondingly, researchers nowadays pay less attention to the role
of monetary aggregates and increasingly employ money demand specifications that allow to
neglect money for the analysis of equilibrium determination (see Dupor, 2001, Woodford,
2003, or Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2004).
In this paper we (re-)assess the role of money for the determination of the price level,
and for uniqueness and stability of equilibrium sequences. In particular, we examine the case
where the evolution of monetary aggregates is non-negligible due to real balance effects, which
typically characterize households’ consumption behavior when transaction services of money
are modelled in an explicit way.5 The classical dichotomy is invalid under this assumption,
which might contribute to the determination of the price level under flexible prices, as shown
by Patinkin (1949, 1965). We find that uniqueness of the price level under interest rate
policy crucially relies on whether the stock of money held at the beginning of the period
or at the end of the period is assumed to provide transaction services. In the latter case,
a rational expectations equilibrium is consistent with any initial price level and, thus, with
multiple price level sequences. If, however, beginning-of-period money relates to households’
transactions, then a rational expectations equilibrium is associated with a unique price level
sequence (nominal determinacy, as defined by Benhabib et al., 2001). A rational expectations
equilibrium can further be uniquely determined (real determinacy), if interest rates are set
contingent on current inflation rate. Then, real money becomes a relevant predetermined
state variable, which implies that interest rate policy should be passive to avoid explosive
or oscillatory equilibrium sequences.6 When end-of-period money is assumed to provide
transaction services, real balance effects turn out to be (almost) negligible for equilibrium
determination, and the principles for real determinacy in cashless economies (see Woodford,
2003) apply.7
There are a variety of means to induce demand for money, i.e., a non-interest bearing
government liability, in general equilibrium models. Most of them, for example, cash-in-
advance constraints (Clower, 1967), real resource costs of transactions (Feenstra, 1986), or
shopping time specifications (McCallum and Goodfriend, 1987), refer to the transaction role
of money. An alternative way to induce households to hold a positive amount of money
4See also De Fiore and Liu (2004), Gali et al. (2004), Meng (2002), or Weder (2004)
5Real balance effects can thus be viewed as a reasonable property, since if money is assumed to provide
transaction services then these benefits should be related to households’ actual volume of transactions (see
McCallum, 2001, or Woodford, 2003).
6An interest rate peg can, however, not lead to a uniquely determined rational expectations equilibrium
and, therefore, leads to multiple price level sequences, which contrasts the result in Benassy (2000), who
introduces real balance effects via an overlapping generations structure.
7It should be noted that a rational expectations equilibrium is consistent with any initial price level (nominal
indeterminacy), if there are no real balance effects.
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is to assume that money enters the utility (MIU) function, which originates in Sidrauski’s
(1967) seminal paper. This is probably the most widely applied approach to money demand
in the recent literature on monetary policy analysis (see, e.g., Woodford, 2003), and is often
viewed as being closely related to the aforementioned specifications. In fact, Brock (1974)
and Feenstra (1986) have shown that assuming MIU can be equivalent to the more explicit
specifications of transaction frictions. However, for an exact equivalence, real balances and
consumption should enter the utility function in a non-separable way. While this property
is commonly neglected, since real balance effects are typically found to be very small (see,
e.g., Lucas, 2000, or Ireland, 2003), we show that this can have substantial consequences for
equilibrium determination, which under sticky prices does not rely on the magnitude of the
real balance effect.
We develop a discrete time dynamic general equilibrium model, where money enters a non-
separable utility function and prices are either completely flexible or set in a staggered way.
We apply two different assumptions about the particular stock of money that enters the utility
function, either the stock of money held at the beginning or at the end of the period. The
former assumption corresponds to Svensson’s (1985) cash-in-advance specification, where the
goods market opens before the asset market, and is, for example, applied in Woodford (1990),
McCallum and Nelson (1999), or Lucas (2000). The second assumption can be interpreted
as a short-cut for a specification where households can always adjust their money holdings in
accordance with their current transactions. It avoids Hahn’s (1965) paradox in finite horizon
general equilibrium models and is now widely applied in infinite horizon models (see, e.g.,
Woodford, 2003).
We focus on the role of money demand and monetary policy rules for the determination
of locally stable equilibrium sequences at the steady state. It turns out that the unique de-
termination of the price level relates (under completely flexible prices) to the property of real
balances to serve as a relevant state variable.8 For a rational expectations equilibrium to be
characterized by this property, beginning-of-period money has to enter the utility function.
On the contrary, real balances never serve as a relevant state variable if end-of-period money
provides utility. Thus, both versions substantially differ with regard to the role of money held
by households at the beginning of each period. In the former version, beginning-of-period
real balances restrict household’s current consumption expenditures. In the latter version,
households adjust their end-of-period money holdings in accordance with their current con-
sumption expenditures. Hence, beginning-of-period real balances are then determined by the
previous period consumption decision such that the causality is reversed. For the beginning-
of-period value of real balances to be, actually, relevant for the determination of a rational
expectations equilibrium, there must further exist a unique price level sequence consistent
with equilibrium. Put differently, unless there is a uniquely determined price level, there are
multiple real values for the beginning-of-period stock of money, which are consistent with a
rational expectations equilibrium.
Thus, under real balance effects and interest rate policy, a uniquely determined price
level is associated with real money being a relevant state variable and, thus, with a his-
8This property marks a main difference of our framework to the specifications examined in Carlstrom and
Fuerst (2001), who show that different assumptions about the timing of markets can affect the conditions for
(real) equilibrium determinacy under interest rate rules.
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tory dependent evolution of equilibrium sequences, which crucially affects the conditions for
macroeconomic stability. This property has been disregarded in related studies where money
demand specifications are applied which relate to our end-of-period version (see Benhabib et
al., 2001a, Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2001, or Woodford, 2003). The main principles for equi-
librium determination and stability under simple monetary policy feedback rules and flexible
prices can be summarized as follows.9
• For the unique determination of a rational expectations equilibrium and a consistent
price level sequence, i.e., for real and nominal determinacy, beginning-of-period money
has to enter the utility function, and interest rate policy has to respond to current
inflation. Neither an interest rate peg nor a forward looking interest rate rule lead to
this result.
• Under the beginning-of-period specification, an interest rate policy that reacts to changes
in current inflation has to be passive for equilibrium sequences to be uniquely deter-
mined and to converge to the steady state in a non-oscillatory way.
• If the end-of-period specification applies or expected future inflation serves as the policy
indicator, the equilibrium displays nominal indeterminacy, and interest rate policy has
to be active for uniqueness of equilibrium sequences.
• Under a constant money growth regime, equilibrium sequences are consistent with any
initial price level and real money does not serve as a relevant state variable (though,
monetary policy is history dependent). Equilibrium sequences are, in any case, locally
stable and uniquely determined.10
Throughout the analysis we take into account that (stable) equilibrium sequences can be
non-oscillatory or oscillatory, given that the latter property can hardly be viewed as rec-
ommendable for a central bank that aims to stabilize the economy. In the second part of
the paper, we examine the role of real balance effects for the case where prices are sticky
(set in a staggered way), implying that the price level can always be determined. Under
this specification, which has scarcely been examined for related purposes,11 real balances
serve as a relevant predetermined state variable for all aforementioned policy rules, when
the beginning-of-period specification applies. If, however, the end-of-period stock of money
enters the utility function, households are entirely forward looking, and real money serves as
a relevant state variable only if monetary policy is history dependent, i.e., when the central
bank applies a money growth rule. Nonetheless, the determinacy properties under constant
9To be more precise, these results apply for finite labor supply elasticities.
10This result relies on real balance effects to imply consumption and real balances to be Edgeworth-
complements. When they are Edgeworth-substitutes, constant money growth can also lead to real inde-
terminacy, as shown by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2003).
11Exceptions are Benhabib et al. (2001b) and Kurozumi (2004), providing determinacy conditions for
interest rate rules. Benhabib et al. (2001b) apply a continuous time framework, which corresponds to our
version where end-of-period money enters the utility function. Kurozumi (2004) examines the determinacy and
E-stability implications of Taylor-rules in a discrete time framework, and derives results that are consistent
with our findings for the end-of-period specification.
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money growth and sticky prices, which have until now not been analytically assessed,12 are
shown to correspond to those under flexible prices. The main implications for equilibrium
uniqueness and stability under sticky prices are as follows:
• When beginning-of-period money provides utility, interest rate policy has to be passive
to lead to locally stable, unique, and non-oscillatory equilibrium sequences, regardless
whether current or future inflation enters the policy rule. An active interest rate policy
is associated with locally stable and unique equilibrium sequences if and only if end-of-
period money provides utility and current inflation serves as the policy indicator.
• As under flexible prices, the central bank can ensure equilibrium sequence to be uniquely
determined, locally stable, and non-oscillatory under both timing specifications by hold-
ing the growth rate of money constant, provided that real balance effects are not ex-
tremely large.
While these results are derived for the case where the labor supply elasticity is finite, we
further show that the assumption of an infinitely elastic labor supply, which is for example
applied in Dupor (2001), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2004), or Weder (2004) for a related purpose,
is not harmless for the local equilibrium properties under interest rate policy. For example,
we find that an equilibrium under interest rate policy and flexible prices is then consistent
with any initial price level, and that the well-established principles for real determinacy under
sticky prices for a separable utility function (see Woodford, 2003) apply when end-of-period
money provides utility.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model. Section
3 analyses nominal and real determinacy under flexible prices. In the first part, we consider
the case where the beginning-of-period stock of money provides utility, while the results
for the end-of-period specification are briefly summarized in the second part.13 For both
specifications, we derive the implications for equilibrium determination and local stability
under current and forward looking interest rate rules, and for money growth rules. The last
part of section 3 discusses our findings and compares them to results in related studies. The
first two parts of section 4, which focuses on the conditions for real determinacy when prices
are set in a staggered way, are structured as in previous section. The third part of section 4
discusses the main mechanisms, which are responsible for the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
In this section an infinite horizon general equilibrium model with representative agents is
developed. We consider a money in the utility function specification that leads to real balance
effects. We further allow for prices to be set in a staggered way to facilitate comparisons with
related studies, such as Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) or Woodford (2003). Monetary policy is
either specified in form of an interest rate feedback rule or constant money growth. To check
12Evans and Honkapohja (2003) provide a numerical analysis of real determinacy under constant money
growth in a sticky price framework without real balance effects.
13Our findings for the latter case correspond to the results in Benhabib et al. (2001a), Carlstrom and Fuerst
(2001), and Woodford (2003)
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for the robustness of the results for the former policy regime, we apply contemporaneous and
forward looking interest rate rules. Uncertainty is due to an aggregate productivity shock
which realizes at the beginning of the period.
Lower (upper) case letters denote real (nominal) variables. There is a continuum of
identical and infinitely lived households. At the beginning of period t, households’ financial
wealth comprises money Mt−1, a portfolio of state contingent claims on other households
yielding a (random) payment Zt, and nominally non-state contingent government bonds
Bt−1 carried over from the previous period. Let qt,t+1 denote the period t price of one unit of
currency in a particular state of period t + 1 normalized by the probability of occurrence of
that state, conditional on the information available in period t. Then, the price of a random
payoff Zt+1 in period t+1 is given by Et[qt,t+1Zt+1]. The households’ budget constraint reads
Mt + Bt + Et[qt,t+1Zt+1] + Ptct ≤ Rt−1Bt−1 + Mt−1 + Zt + Ptwtlt + Ptωt − Ptτt, (1)
where ct denotes consumption, Pt the aggregate price level, wt the real wage rate, lt work-
ing time, τt a lump-sum tax, Rt the gross nominal interest rate on government bonds,
and ωt profits of firms. Further, households have to fulfill the no-Ponzi game condition,




βtu (ct, lt, At/Pt) , β ∈ (0, 1), (2)
where β denotes the subjective discount factor and At nominal balances, which will be defined
below. The instantaneous utility function is assumed to satisfy
uc > 0, ul < 0, ua > 0, ucc < 0, uaa < 0, ull ≤ 0, (3)
uca > 0, ucl = ual = 0, uccuaa − u2ca > 0, (4)
and the usual Inada-conditions, where at = At/Pt. According to (4) the cross derivative
uca is (strictly) positive, such that marginal utility of consumption rises with real money
balances. The resulting properties, i.e., non-separability and real balance effects, typically
emerge under more explicit specifications of transaction frictions. As, for example, shown by
Brock (1974) or Feenstra (1986), a money-in-the-utility (MIU) function specification, which
is equivalent to a specification where purchases of consumption goods are associated with
transaction costs that are either measured by shopping time or real resources, is usually
characterized by these properties. To be more precise, introducing these transaction friction
in a corresponding model with a utility function v(ct, 1− lt) would lead to real balance effects,
which are equivalent to a MIU specification with uca > 0, if (but not only if) the labor supply
elasticity is finite (see appendix 6.1). It should be noted that an infinite labor supply elasticity
will lead to be of particular interest in what follows.
To avoid additional complexities, we assume that the respective cross derivatives are equal
to zero ulc = ula = 0. The last assumption in (4), uccuaa − u2ca > 0, is imposed to ensure –
together with ucc < 0 and uaa < 0 (see 3) – the utility function to be strictly concave. The
conditions in (3)-(4) further ensure that real money balances and consumption are normal
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goods, i.e. that the utility function exhibits increasing expansion paths with respect to money
and consumption.
The variable At describes the relevant stock of money that provides – in real terms –
utility. Throughout the paper, we consider two cases, where At denotes money either held at






The B-version, which, for example, relates to the money-in-the-utility function specifications
in Woodford (1990), McCallum and Nelson (1999), or Lucas (2000), is consistent with Svens-
son’s (1985) timing assumption where the goods market is closed before the asset market is
opened. This means that the representative agent in period t relies on the stock of money
carried over from the previous period for transactions in the goods market. In the end-of-
period specification (E-version), which can for example be found in Brock (1974), Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2000), or Woodford (2003), the stock of money held at the end of the period is
assumed to provide transaction services.
Maximizing (2) subject to (1) and the no-Ponzi game condition for given initial values
M−1 > 0, Z0 and B−1 ≥ 0 leads to the following first order conditions for consumption,
money, labor supply, government bonds, and contingent claims:
λt =
{
uc (ct,mt−1/πt) version B







Et[ua (ct+1,mt/πt+1) /πt+1] version B
β−1ua (ct,mt) version E
, (6)
ul(lt) = −wtλt, (7)
λt = βRtEt[λt+1π−1t+1], (8)
qt,t+1 = β (λt+1/λt) π−1t+1, (9)
where it = Rt − 1 denotes the net interest rate on government bonds, λt denotes a Lagrange
multiplier, πt the inflation rate πt = Pt/Pt−1, and mt real balances mt = Mt/Pt. Equation
(9) holds for each state in period t + 1, and determines the price of one unit of currency
for a particular state at time t + 1 normalized by the conditional probability of occurrence
of that state in units of currency in period t. Arbitrage-freeness between government bonds
and contingent claims requires Rt = 1/Etqt,t+1. Note that beginning-of-period real balances
mt−1 enter the set of first order conditions only in case B. The optimum is further character-
ized by the budget constraint (1) holding with equality and by the transversality condition





The final consumption good is an aggregate of differentiated goods produced by monop-
14These specifications are related, but not identical, to those applied in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001). In
particular, they assume that the monetary aggregate, which enters the utility function, is either given by
At = Mt−1 + Rt−1Bt − Bt + Ptτt or At = Mt−1 + Rt−1Bt − Bt + Ptτt − Ptct + Ptyt. As a consequence,
money demand can matter for local uniqueness of the equilibrium sequences of inflation and consumption
under interest rate policy, even if the utility function is separable.
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olistically competitive firms indexed with i ∈ [0, 1]. The CES aggregator of differentiated








it di, with ε > 1, where yt is the number of units of the final
good, yit the amount produced by firm i, and ε the constant elasticity of substitution between
these differentiated goods. Let Pit and Pt denote the price of good i set by firm i and the
price index for the final good. The demand for each differentiated good is yit = (Pit/Pt)
−ε yt,




it di. A firm i produces good yi employing a technology which is linear in
the labor input: yit = stlit, where lt =
∫ 1
0 litdi and st is an i.i.d. productivity shock with mean
one. Hence, labor demand satisfies: mcit = wt/st, where mcit = mct denotes real marginal
costs.
We allow for a nominal rigidity in form of a staggered price setting as developed by
Calvo (1983). Each period firms may reset their prices with the probability 1 − φ in-
dependently of the time elapsed since the last price setting. The fraction φ ∈ [0, 1) of
firms are assumed to adjust their previous period’s prices according to the simple rule
Pit = πPit−1, where π denotes the average inflation rate. Note that if φ > 0, the initial
price level Pi−1 has to be known by these firms. Firms are assumed to maximize their mar-
ket value, which equals the expected sum of discounted dividends Et
∑∞
s=0 qt,t+sDit+s, where
Dit ≡ (Pit − Ptmct) yit and we used that firms also have access to contingent claims. In
each period a measure 1 − φ of randomly selected firms set new prices P̃it as the solution
to max ePit Et ∑∞s=0 φsqt,t+s(πsP̃ityit+s − Pt+smct+syit+s), s.t. yit+s = (πsP̃it)−εP εt+syt+s. The
































)−ε + (1− φ)P̃−εt . If prices are flexible, φ = 0, then the first order condition for the
optimal price of the differentiated good reads: mct = ε−1ε .
The public sector consists of a fiscal and a monetary authority. We consider two widely
applied specifications for the monetary policy regime. The first regime is characterized by the
central bank setting the nominal interest rate contingent on current or on future inflation.
Rt = ρ (πt) , or Rt = ρ (Etπt+1) , with ρ′ ≥ 0, Rt ≥ 1. (11)
We disregard output (gap) as an indicator for interest rate policy, which is for example
suggested by Taylor (1993). It turns out to be crucial for the impact of real balance effects on
the determination of the price level and the equilibrium sequences, that the current inflation
rate can be determined. Thus, for our purposes it is sufficient to focus on the cases where
interest rates are set contingent either on current or on expected future inflation.
We further assume that the steady state condition R = π/β has a unique solution for
R > 1. According to the interest rate feedback rule (11), the response of the interest rate to
changes in inflation, ρπ, is non-negative. The second regime, is characterized by the central
bank holding the money growth constant Mt/Mt−1 = µ, where µ ≥ 1 :
mtπt/mt−1 = µ. (12)
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The fiscal authority issues risk-free one period bonds, receives lump-sum taxes from house-
holds, and transfers from the monetary authority, such that the consolidated budget con-
straint reads: Rt−1Bt−1 + Mt−1 = Mt + Bt + Ptτt. We assume that tax policy guarantees





3 Equilibrium determination under flexible prices
In this section, we assess how real balance effects and monetary policy affect the determination
of the price level and of the rational expectations equilibrium when prices are flexible, φ = 0.
As described in the previous section, we consider two versions of the model which differ with
regard to the stock of money that enters the utility function, i.e., the B-version and the
E-version, and we consider three types of monetary policy rules described by (11) or (12).
The equilibrium under flexible prices (φ = 0) can then be summarized as follows.
Definition 1 A rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is a set of sequences {ct, πt, at,
Rt}∞t=0 satisfying ul(ct/st) = −st ε−1ε uc (ct, at), uc (ct, at) = βRtEt[uc (ct+1, at+1) π−1t+1], and
(Rt − 1)Et[uc (ct+1, at+1) /πt+1] = Et[ua (ct+1, at+1) /πt+1] for at = mt−1/πt (B-version) or
(Rt − 1)Et[uc (ct+1, at+1) /πt+1] = β−1ua (ct, at) for at = mt (E-version), the transversality
condition, and a monetary policy (11) or (12), for {st}∞t=0, a given initial money endowment
M−1 > 0, and any initial price level P−1 satisfying P−1 > 0.
To identify the differences between the model versions, it is crucial to take into account that
the determination of a REE does not require a given initial value for the price level. In the E-
version, equilibrium sequences {ct, πt, at = At/Pt, Rt}∞t=0 can be determined independently
of the initial price level, such that a particular REE is consistent with any initial price level
and thus with multiple price level sequences. In the B-version, the initial price level can be
relevant for the equilibrium sequences due to its effect on the initial value for real balances
m−1, which might affect the consumption decision (see 5). Thus, the price level is non-neutral
for the REE, such that a particular set of equilibrium sequences is associated with a unique
price level sequence. This property is often summarized by the notion “nominal determinacy”
(see Benhabib et al., 2001a). It is crucial to note that the role of the initial price level does not
relate to the unique determination of equilibrium sequences (including the inflation sequence)
which is summarized by the notion “real indeterminacy”. These properties are summarized
in the following definition, which corresponds to the definition applied in Benhabib et al.
(2001a).
Definition 2 The equilibrium displays real determinacy if there exists a unique set of equi-
librium sequences {ct, πt, at, Rt}∞t=0. The equilibrium displays nominal indeterminacy if for
any particular set of equilibrium sequences, there exist infinite many initial price levels P−1
consistent with a rational expectations equilibrium.
A REE, which is characterized by real determinacy (equilibrium uniqueness) and, thus,
a unique inflation sequence, can be associated with multiple price level sequences. If, for
example, there are no real balance effects (uca = 0), the price level is neutral with regard to
the determination of equilibrium sequences {ct, πt, Rt}∞t=0 under interest rate policy, such that
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two different values for the initial price level together with an equilibrium inflation sequence
lead to two different price level sequences consistent with the REE. Evidently, one cannot
uniquely determine a price level sequence if there are infinitely many equilibrium inflation
sequences, which implies real determinacy.
In the following analysis, we apply Blanchard and Kahn’s (1980) approach to the analysis
of a rational expectations equilibrium. For this, we focus on the model’s behavior in the
neighborhood of the steady state, and apply a linear approximation of the set of non-linear
equilibrium conditions. We, therefore, assume that the bounds on the fluctuations of the
log productivity ‖ log st‖ are sufficiently tight, such that st remains in the neighborhood of
its steady state value. Throughout, we restrict our attention to locally stable equilibrium
sequences, i.e., to equilibrium sequences that converge to the steady state.
3.1 Beginning-of-period money
We start with the case where the beginning-of-period stock of money enters the utility func-
tion. The deterministic steady state is then characterized by the following properties: R =
π/β, −ul(c) = uc(c, m/π) (ε− 1) /ε, and uc(c,m/π)
(
R− 1) = ua(m/π, c). A discussion of
the existence and uniqueness of a steady state for R > 1 can be found in appendix 6.2. Log-
linearizing the model at the steady state, leads to the following set of equilibrium conditions:
εcam̂t−1 − εcaπ̂t = (σl + σc) ĉt − (1 + σl) ŝt, (13)
σcĉt − εcam̂t−1 + εcaπ̂t = σcEtĉt+1 − εcam̂t + (εca + 1)Etπ̂t+1 − R̂t, (14)
(εca + σa) m̂t = −zR̂t + (σc + φac) Etĉt+1 + (εca + σa) Etπ̂t+1, (15)
where z ≡ R/(R−1) > 1, σl ≡ lullul ≥ 0, σc ≡ −
cucc
uc
> 0, σa ≡ −auaaua > 0, εca ≡ aucauc > 0, and
φac ≡ cuacua > 0, and x̂t denotes the percent deviation of a generic variable xt from its steady
state value x : x̂ = log(xt)− log(x). These conditions (and the transversality condition) have
to be satisfied by the sequences for the steady state deviations of consumption, real balances,
the inflation rate, and of the nominal interest rate, {ĉt, π̂t, m̂t−1, R̂t}∞t=0 for {ŝt}∞t=0 and a
monetary policy regime satisfying
R̂t = ρππ̂t, or R̂t = ρπEtπ̂t+1, or m̂t = m̂t−1 − π̂t, (16)
where ρπ denotes the steady state inflation elasticity ρπ ≡ ρ′(π)(π/R) ≥ 0. It should be noted
that concavity of the utility function implies: Υ ≡ σcσa − εcaφac > 0,15 which restricts the
magnitude of real balance effects. A closer look at the equilibrium conditions (13) and (14)
reveals that the private sector behavior is not independent of the beginning-of-period value
for real balances m̂t−1, as they are (implicitly) assumed to lower households’ transactions
costs. Given that m̂t−1 is predetermined, the households’ behavior can induce the economy
to evolve in a history dependent way. Yet, m̂t−1 enters the equilibrium conditions jointly with
the current inflation rate. Thus, real money serves as a relevant predetermined state variable,
only if the current inflation rate is determined. This further implies that the equilibrium
15We view this as a realistic implication, given that estimates of εca and φac, are usually found to be small.
According to US estimates reported in Woodford (2003), εca does not exceed 0.005 and φac ≤ 2.
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displays nominal determinacy.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium displays nominal determinacy, if the beginning-of-period
stock of money enters the utility function.
Monetary policy is further decisive for real determinacy and, thus, for the possibility to
uniquely determine a price level sequence. In the subsequent analysis, we will show that
this requires the central bank to set the nominal interest rate contingent on current inflation.
Under an interest rate peg, ρπ = 0, an inflation sequence and, therefore, a price level sequence
cannot be uniquely determined.16
We, firstly, examine the case where the central bank sets the nominal interest rate ac-
cording to an interest rate feedback rule. At first, we consider current inflation as the policy
indicator, R̂t = ρππ̂t. The following proposition summarizes the equilibrium properties for
the cases where the labor supply elasticity 1/σl takes a finite value or is infinite.
Proposition 2 (B, Interest rate policy, R̂t = ρππ̂t) Consider that beginning-of-period money
enters the utility function and that the nominal interest rate is set contingent on changes in
current inflation R̂t = ρππ̂t.
1. When the labor supply elasticity is finite, σl > 0 , the equilibrium displays real determi-
nacy and local stability if and only if
(a) ρπ1 < ρπ < 1 for εca > σa2z−1 and σl > σl, leading to non-oscillatory equilibrium
sequences, or ρπ ∈ (1, ρπ1), leading to oscillatory equilibrium sequences,
(b) ρπ > 1 for εca < σa2z−1 or σl < σl, leading to oscillatory equilibrium sequences,
where ρπ1 ≡ σl(εca+σa)+Υσl(2z−1)εca−σlσa−Υ and σl ≡
Υ
(2z−1)εca−σa .
2. When the labor supply elasticity is infinite, σl = 0, consumption ĉt cannot uniquely
be determined, while the equilibrium sequences {Etĉt+1, π̂t, m̂t, R̂t}∞t=0 are locally stable
and uniquely determined if and only if ρπ > 1.
Proof. See appendix 6.3.
Proposition 2 reveals that the requirements for local equilibrium stability and uniqueness in
terms of the policy parameter ρπ are not robust with regard to changes in the elasticities
εca and σl.17 For finite labor supply elasticities, σl > 0, passiveness is necessary for locally
stable, unique, and non-oscillatory equilibrium sequences (see part 1a). An interest rate peg,
however, violates the conditions in part 1 of proposition 2 and, thus, implies real indetermi-
nacy. Under an active interest rate policy, locally stable and unique equilibrium sequences
are oscillatory, which is hardly recommendable for a central bank that aims at stabilizing
16It should further be noted that a REE displays nominal indeterminacy if there are no real balance effects,
εca = φac = 0. Nevertheless, one can always compute a price level sequence for a particular initial price level
and a sequence of inflation rates.
17Note that for the sets (ρπ1, 1) and (1, ρπ1) (see part 1a. of proposition 2) to be non-empty σl > Υ[(z −
1)εca − σa]−1 and εca > σa/(z− 1), and, respectively, σl < Υ[(z− 1)εca − σa]−1 or εca < σa/(z− 1) has to be
satisfied.
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the economy. Thus, when beginning-of-period money relates to households’ consumption,
interest rate policy that reacts on current inflation should rather be passive than active for
macroeconomic stability and for the unique determination of the price level.
To see this, suppose that inflation exceeds its steady state value and equilibrium sequences
are non-oscillatory.18 Given that the inflation elasticity is positive, ρπ > 0, the nominal
interest rate rises, which – ceteris paribus – causes households to reduce their end-of-period
real money holdings m̂t, by (15). According to (14), the expected real interest rate is further
negatively related to the growth rate of real balances. Thus, an active interest rate setting,
ρπ > 1, leads to a decline in the level and the growth rate of real balances, such that the
sequences of real balances and, thus, of consumption and inflation do not converge to the
steady state.
Notably, the equilibrium exhibits different properties for an infinite labor supply elasticity,
σl = 0 (see part 2 of proposition 2). In this case, the amount of labor supplied by the
households is not related to their consumption expenditures, and the marginal utility of
consumption is exogenously determined (see 13): ĥt = −ŝt, where ĥt = εcam̂t−1 − σcĉt −
εcaπ̂t. Hence, (14) and (15) reduce to ŝt − Etŝt+1 = Etπ̂t+1 − R̂t and σam̂t = −zR̂t +
φacEtĉt+1 +σaEtπ̂t+1 +Etŝt+1, implying that the equilibrium is not associated with a unique
value for beginning-of-period real money and that current consumption cannot be determined.
The equilibrium sequences for Etĉt+1, π̂t, m̂t, and R̂t are then locally stable and uniquely
determined for an active interest rate policy, which contrasts the results for the case of finite
labor supply elasticities, σl > 0, presented in part 1 of proposition 2.
We now turn to the case where the central bank applies a forward looking rule, R̂t =
ρπEtπ̂t+1.
Proposition 3 (B, Interest rate policy, R̂t = ρπEtπ̂t+1) Consider that beginning-of-period
money enters the utility function and that the nominal interest rate is set contingent on
changes in future inflation R̂t = ρπEtπ̂t+1. Then, consumption and inflation cannot uniquely
be determined.
1. When the labor supply elasticity is finite, σl > 0 , then ρπ > 1 is a necessary condition
for uniqueness and local stability of the equilibrium sequences {Etĉt+1, Etπ̂t+1, m̂t, R̂t}∞t=0.
Necessary and sufficient conditions are given by:
(a) 1 < ρπ for σl > σl2 and εca > σaz−1 ,
(b) 1 < ρπ < ρπ2, for σl < σl2 or εca < σaz−1 , or 1 < ρπ2 < ρπ if σl > σl and εca >
σa
2z−1 ,
for σl ∈ (σl, σl2) or εca ∈ ( σa2z−1 , σaz−1),
(c) 1 < ρπ2 < ρπ < −ρπ1 for σl < σl or εca < σa2z−1 ,
where σl2 ≡ Υ(z−1)εca−σa and ρπ2 ≡
Υ+σl(εca+σa)
Υ+σl(εca+σa)−zεcaσl .
2. When the labor supply elasticity is infinite, σl = 0 , then the equilibrium sequences
{Etĉt+1, Etπ̂t+1, m̂t, R̂t}∞t=0 are locally stable and uniquely determined if and only if
ρπ 6= 1.
18The latter property implies that current and expected future inflation are not negatively related.
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Proof. See appendix 6.4.
Compared to proposition 2 the most fundamental difference relates to the role of the beginning-
of-period real balances, m̂t−1. It turns out that the households’ consumption decision is not
affected by the latter if inflation is indetermined, such as under an interest rate peg or a
forward looking interest rate rule. In these cases, there are infinitely many values for the
current inflation rate that are consistent with the equilibrium conditions. Given that m̂t−1
enters the latter jointly with the current inflation rate, there are also multiple admissible
values for beginning-of-period real balances m̂t−1. If, however, current inflation serves as the
policy indicator, it can be determined in every period, such that m̂t−1 serves as a relevant
determinant for current consumption by the equilibrium condition (13). As a consequence,
the initial price level P−1 (and, thus, the initial stock of money m−1 = M−1/P−1), matters
for the equilibrium allocation. If, however, the central bank sets the nominal interest rate
contingent on expected future inflation, one can only determine the expected future values
but not the current values for inflation and consumption. Subsequent to the initial period,
households will adjust m̂t in accordance with their desired future consumption Etĉt+1, so that
their behavior is not history dependent. Thus, the beginning-of period real value of money is
then irrelevant, and there are multiple price level sequences (though the equilibrium displays
nominal determinacy).
For equilibrium sequences to be locally stable and unique the inflation elasticity ρπ has to
satisfy certain conditions.19 Under an interest rate rule featuring current inflation, it turns
out that there is no robust value for the inflation elasticity that ensures local stability and
uniqueness. For example, when the real balance effect and the labor supply elasticity satisfy
εca >
σa
2z−1 and σl >
Υ
(2z−1)εca−σa , interest rate policy should be passive, ρπ < 1, while the
inverse, ρπ > 1, is required under εca < σa2z−1 or σl < σl (see proposition 2). When the central
bank sets the nominal interest rate contingent on expected future inflation, activeness ρπ > 1
is always necessary (but not sufficient) for uniqueness. As in the previous case (see part 2 of
proposition 2), the equilibrium exhibits different properties if the labor supply elasticity is
infinite σl = 0 as described in part 2 of proposition 3. With a forward looking interest rate
rule, the model then reduces to a set of static equilibrium conditions characterized by unique
equilibrium sequences {Etĉt+1, Etπ̂t+1, m̂t, R̂t}∞t=0 for any non-zero inflation elasticity ρπ 6= 1.
Under a money growth regime equilibrium determination is less sensitive. Ruling out
unreasonable parameter values, we focus, for convenience, on the case where the inverse of the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution of money is not extremely large, σa < z = R/(R−1).20
Proposition 4 (B, Money growth policy) Suppose that beginning-of-period money en-
ters the utility function and that σa < z. Under a constant money growth rule, the equilibrium
sequences {ĉt, π̂t, m̂t−1} ∀t ≥ 1 and {R̂t} ∀t ≥ 0, are locally stable and uniquely determined,
and there exists a unique consistent price level ∀t ≥ 0.
Proof. See appendix 6.5.
19Non-emptiness of the sets for ρπ requires ρπ2 > 1 and −ρπ1 > ρπ2 , which is fulfilled for the given
restrictions on σl and εca in part 1b and 1c.
20It should be noted that σa < z is just a sufficient precondition for the result in proposition 4 and hardly
restrictive if one assigns values for σa that relate to reasonable magnitudes of σ.
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A comparison of the results in the propositions 2-4 shows that the money growth regime
leads to an equilibrium behavior being different from the behavior under both interest rate
policy regimes. On the one hand, the price level can always be determined if real balances
are determined, given that the value for the nominal stock of money is known in every
period. On the other hand, the initial values for the inflation rate π̂0 and real money m̂−1
are irrelevant for equilibrium determination, implying that there are – for different initial
price levels – multiple values for both which are consistent with a unique set of equilibrium
sequences {ĉt, π̂t, m̂t−1}∞t=1 and {R̂t}∞t=0. As a consequence, the REE does not feature real
balances as a relevant endogenous state variable. Put differently, for the economy to evolve
in a history dependent way, it is, therefore, not sufficient that monetary policy is conducted
in a backward looking way. In fact, it is the households’ consumption decision rather than a
restriction on the evolution of money, which is responsible for the equilibrium sequences to
depend on beginning-of-period money holdings. There is an analogy to the role of physical
capital in a standard real business cycle model with a depreciation rate equal to one. Capital
remains a relevant state variable, even though the model (virtually) lacks an accumulation
equation.21
3.2 End-of-period money
Next, we will briefly summarize the requirements for equilibrium determination under the
assumption that end-of-period money holdings enter the utility function. This case has
also been examined by Benhabib et al. (2001a) and by Woodford (2003) for interest rate
policies, and by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2003) for money growth rules. The deterministic
steady state for this version is characterized by the following conditions, R = π/β, −ul(c) =
uc(c, m) (ε− 1) /ε, and uc(c, m) (R− 1) = ua(m, c).22 Log-linearizing the model summarized
in definition 1 for At = Mt at the steady state with R > 1 leads to the following set of
equilibrium conditions:
εcam̂t = (σl + σc) ĉt − (1 + σl) ŝt, (17)
σcĉt − εcam̂t = σcEtĉt+1 − εcaEtm̂t+1 − R̂t + Etπ̂t+1, (18)
(εca + σa) m̂t = (φac + σc) ĉt − (z − 1) R̂t. (19)
The conditions (17)-(19), the transversality condition, and a monetary policy rule (16) have
to be satisfied by sequences {ĉt, π̂t, m̂t, R̂t}∞t=0 for {ŝt}∞t=0. In contrast to the B-version, con-
sumption and inflation are independent of beginning-of-period real balances. Put differently,
the private sector behavior is entirely forward-looking in the E-version with the consequence
that the equilibrium displays nominal indeterminacy.
Proposition 5 The equilibrium displays nominal indeterminacy, if the end-of-period stock
of money enters the utility function.





t , where kt−1 denotes the beginning-of-period stock of physical capital and α ∈ (0, 1), and a capital
depreciation rate of 100%. Nevertheless, capital serves as a relevant state variable, i.e., kt−1 affects the
equilibrium allocation in period t.
22A discussion of steady state uniqueness is provided in appendix 6.2.
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The following proposition summarizes the conditions for equilibrium determination under
interest rate policy.
Proposition 6 (E, Interest rate policy) Suppose that end-of-period money enters the util-
ity function and that the central bank sets the nominal interest rate.
1. When current inflation enters the interest rate rule, R̂t = ρππ̂t, the equilibrium displays
real determinacy and local stability if and only if ρπ > 1.
2. When future inflation enters the interest rate rule, R̂t = ρπEtπ̂t+1, inflation cannot
uniquely be determined. The equilibrium sequences {ĉt, Etπ̂t+1, m̂t, R̂t}∞t=0 are locally




for σl > 0, and ii) ρπ 6= 1 for σl = 0.
Proof. See appendix 6.6.
As in the B-version, equilibrium determination depends on the particular interest rate rule.
When the nominal interest rate is set contingent on current inflation, inflation can be deter-
mined for all periods. Under a forward looking interest rate policy, one can only uniquely
determine expected future inflation. In any case, the initial price level and initial real balances
are irrelevant for a REE, implying nominal indeterminacy and the absence of an endogenous
state variable. Uniqueness of equilibrium sequences is further ensured by an active interest
rate policy, ρπ > 1, under both types of rules. For the special case, where the labor supply
elasticity is infinite, any forward looking interest rate rule satisfying ρπ 6= 1 leads to unique
equilibrium sequences {ĉt, Etπ̂t+1, m̂t, R̂t}∞t=0. Turning to the case where the central bank
holds the money growth rate constant, we find that the equilibrium behavior closely relates
to the one in the B-version.
Proposition 7 (E, Money growth policy) Suppose that end-of-period money enters the
utility function and that the money growth rate is held constant. Then, the equilibrium se-
quences {ĉt, m̂t, R̂t} ∀t ≥ 0 and {π̂t} ∀t ≥ 1 are locally stable and uniquely determined, and
there exists a unique consistent price level ∀t ≥ 0.
Proof. See appendix 6.7.
To summarize, the specification of money demand has substantial consequences for the deter-
mination of equilibrium sequences and for macroeconomic stability. The beginning-of-period
value for real money balances is only relevant for equilibrium determination in the B-version
under a non-forward looking interest rate rule. In the E-version, where the households’ be-
havior lacks any backward looking element, the initial value of real balances is irrelevant for
any policy regime under consideration. Whether beginning-of period real money is serving
as a relevant endogenous state variable or not, is, on the one hand, decisive for a unique de-
termination of a price level, and, on the other hand, crucially affects the conditions for local
stability and uniqueness under an interest rate policy regime: Policy should rather be passive
than active, to avoid unstable or oscillatory equilibrium sequences. Under a constant money
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growth regime, however, real determinacy and uniqueness of a price level sequence is ensured
for both versions. In particular, consumption is determined regardless of the labor supply
elasticity. This contrasts the findings under interest rate policy, where current consumption
and, thus, household welfare cannot uniquely be determined if the labor supply elasticity is
infinite, or if interest rates are set contingent on changes in expected future inflation.
3.3 Related results
The main novel results in this section refer to the case where beginning-of-period money enters
the utility function and the central bank applies an interest rate rule, while some results for
the alternative cases correspond to results in related studies on real balances effects and
equilibrium determinacy in flexible price models. For example, our findings for the E-version
(see part 1 of proposition 6) resemble the results in Benhabib et al. (2001a) and Woodford
(2003) for non-separable utility functions. They find that when current inflation serves as
an indicator, active interest rate setting is necessary and sufficient for local stability and
uniqueness. This, however, changes when beginning-of-period money provides utility, since
equilibrium sequences are then – except for the case σl = 0 – unstable or oscillatory (see
proposition 2). Thus, the literature has disregarded the role of predetermined real balances
as a relevant state variable, which substantially affects the real and nominal determinacy
properties.
If the monetary authority applies a constant money growth rule, then local stability and
uniqueness impose restrictions on preferences only in case where the stock of money held at
the beginning of the period provides utility. In particular, the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution for real money balances should not be too large (see proposition 4),
which corresponds to the results in Brock (1974), Matsuyama (1990), Carlstrom and Fuerst
(2003), and Woodford (2003). Assuming that end-of-period money provides transaction
services, Brock (1974), Matsuyama (1990), and Woodford (2003), show that local stability
and uniqueness is ensured if consumption and real balances are Edgeworth-complements,
as in our framework. Furthermore, Carlstrom and Fuerst (2003) find that the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution for money can matter for local stability and uniqueness is guaranteed,
as in proposition 4.
To unveil the role of non-separability for the results and to facilitate comparisons with
related studies (see, e.g., Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2001), we further briefly discuss the case
where money demand is separable, εca = φac = 0. Then, the model reduces to
R̂t = Etπ̂t+1, and σam̂t =
{
− (z − σa) R̂t for the B-version
− (z − 1) R̂t for the E-version
.
while consumption is exogenously determined. When utility is separable, the conditions
for uniqueness under money growth policy, which are presented in proposition 4 and 7, are
unchanged. In contrast to the results for the non-separable case, the particular stock of
money that enters the utility function is now irrelevant for equilibrium determination under
interest rate policy: Equilibrium uniqueness requires ρπ > 1 for R̂t = ρππ̂t and ρπ 6= 1 for
R̂t = ρπEtπ̂t+1, which accords to the results in Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001). As in the case of
non-separable utility, current inflation cannot be determined under a forward looking interest
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rate rule, while under a money growth rule inflation is only indetermined in the first period.
4 Staggered Price Setting
In this section, the conditions for local stability and uniqueness of a rational expectations
equilibrium under staggered price setting are derived for the same versions as in the previous
section. The equilibrium under sticky prices (φ > 0) can be summarized as follows.
Definition 3 A rational expectations equilibrium is a set of sequences {ct, lt, λt, πt, P ∗t ,
Pt, P̃t, mct, wt, at, Rt}∞t=0, where at = mt−1/πt (B-version) or at = mt (E-version),
satisfying the firms’ first order conditions wt = stmct, (10) where P̃it = P̃t, and P
1−ε
t =
φ (πPt−1)1−ε + (1− φ) P̃ 1−εt , the households’ first order conditions (5)-(8) and πt = Pt/Pt−1,
the aggregate resource constraint ct = (P ∗t /Pt)εstlt, and (P ∗t )−ε = φ
(
πP ∗t−1
)−ε + (1− φ)P̃−εt ,
the transversality condition, and monetary policy (11) or (12), for {st}∞t=0 and given initial
values P−1 > 0, P ∗−1 > 0, and m−1 = M−1/P−1 > 0.
Note that in the version with staggered price setting the initial price indices P−1 and P ∗−1
add to the set of given initial values, which under flexible prices only consists of initial cash
balances M−1. Thus, there is a unique sequence of aggregate prices {Pt}∞t=0, whenever the
current inflation rate πt is uniquely determined. We will, therefore, not refer to the issue of
price level determination in what follows.
4.1 Beginning-of-period money
As in the previous section, we firstly consider the B-version where beginning-of-period money
provides utility, At = Mt−1. Log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions summarized in def-
inition 3 at the steady state with R > 1 (see appendix 6.2) leads to the following set of
conditions
π̂t − βEtπ̂t+1 = χ [(σl + σc) ĉt − εcam̂t−1 + εcaπ̂t]− χ (1 + σl) ŝt, (20)
σcĉt − εcam̂t−1 + εcaπ̂t = σcEtĉt+1 − εcam̂t + (εca + 1)Etπ̂t+1 − R̂t, (21)
(εca + σa) m̂t = −zR̂t + (σc + φac)Etĉt+1 + (εca + σa) Etπ̂t+1, (22)
where χ = (1− φ) (1− βφ) φ−1 > 0 (see Yun, 1996). The conditions (20)-(22) have together
with the transversality condition and a monetary policy rule (16) to be satisfied by sequences
{ĉt, π̂t, m̂t−1, R̂t}∞t=0 for {ŝt}∞t=0 and a given initial value m̂−1. It should be noted that in-
flation tends, by the aggregate supply relation (20), to decrease with real money balances.
Given that consumption and money are Edgeworth-complements, marginal utility of con-
sumption increases with real balances. As households seek to equalize the marginal utility
of consumption and leisure (see (5) and (7)), demand for leisure decreases, which leads to a
shift of the labor supply curve towards lower real wages. Hence, a rise in real balances tends
to lower real marginal costs, inducing firms to cut their prices.
The following proposition summarizes the conditions for local stability and uniqueness
for the case where the central bank sets the nominal interest rate contingent on changes in
the current inflation rate, R̂t = ρππ̂t.
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Proposition 8 (B, Interest rate policy, R̂t = ρππ̂t, φ > 0) Suppose that prices are not
perfectly flexible, φ > 0, that beginning-of-period money enters the utility function, and that
the central bank sets the nominal interest rate contingent on changes in current inflation,
R̂t = ρππ̂t.
1. When the labor supply elasticity is finite, σl > 0 , the equilibrium displays real determi-
nacy and local stability,
(a) if and only if ρπ3 < ρπ < 1 for εca > σa(2z−1) and σl > σl, leading to non-oscillatory




< ρπ < ρπ3, leading to oscilla-





< ρπ for εca > σa(2z−1)and σl < σl, or εca <
σa
(2z−1) ,
leading to oscillatory equilibrium sequences,
where ρπ3 ≡ σlχ(εca+σa)+Υ(2β+χ+2)χ[σl(2z−1)εca−σlσa−Υ] and σl ≡
Υ
(2z−1)εca−σa .
2. When the labor supply elasticity is infinite, σl = 0, the equilibrium displays real deter-
minacy and local stability if and only if ρπ > 1.
Proof. See appendix 6.8.
As summarized in part 1 of proposition 8, passive interest rate setting ρπ < 1 is necessary for
locally stable, unique, and non-oscillatory equilibrium sequences, if the labor supply elasticity
is finite σl > 0.23 As in the corresponding case with flexible prices (see part 1 of proposition 2),
real money is a relevant state variable, such that the economy evolves in a history dependent
way. Hence, the central bank should refrain from setting the nominal interest rate in an
active way. Under separable preferences, an active interest rate policy, which leads to an
unstable eigenvalue, is required for local equilibrium uniqueness in the absence of a relevant
endogenous predetermined state variable (see Woodford, 2003). Here, the existence of the
latter is responsible for an active interest rate policy to destabilize the economy. As shown
by Dupor (2001), an analogous result can arise when physical capital is introduced in a sticky
price model. Notably, beginning-of-period real balances are – as in the corresponding case
under flexible prices – irrelevant, when the labor supply elasticity is infinite, σl = 0.
The following proposition summarizes the results for a forward looking interest rate rule,
R̂t = ρπEtπ̂t+1.
Proposition 9 (B, Interest rate policy, R̂t = ρπEtπ̂t+1, φ > 0) Suppose that prices are
not perfectly flexible, φ > 0, that beginning-of-period money enters the utility function, and
that the central bank sets the nominal interest rate contingent on changes in expected fu-
ture inflation, R̂t = ρπEtπ̂t+1. The equilibrium displays real determinacy and local stability
if and only if ρπ < 1, leading to non-oscillatory equilibrium sequences, or if ρπ > −ρπ3
and σl < σl or εca < σa2z−1 , leading to oscillatory equilibrium sequences, where −ρπ3 ≡
Υ(2+2β+χ)+χσl(σa+εca)
χ(Υ+σl((1−2z)εca+σa)) > 1. Otherwise, the equilibrium sequences are unstable.
23Non-emptiness of the sets (ρπ3, 1) and (max

1, βΥ(zσlχεca)
−1	 , ρπ3), requires σl > Υ(β+χ+1)(z−1)εca−σa and
εca >
σa
z−1 , and, respectively, σl <
Υ(β+χ+1)




Proof. See appendix 6.9.
According to the conditions presented in proposition 9, passiveness is necessary and sufficient
for the existence of exactly one stable and positive eigenvalue, if future inflation serves as the
indicator for interest rate policy. In contrast to the former case, this result does not depend
on the labor supply elasticity σl (see proposition 8). If interest rate policy is extremely
reactive, ρπ > max {1,−ρπ3}, equilibrium sequences can also be locally stable and unique,
though they are oscillatory in this case. For any other inflation elasticity, the central bank
induces the equilibrium sequences to be unstable.24
Now, suppose that the central bank conducts monetary policy according to a constant
money growth rule. The following proposition summarizes the local equilibrium properties,
where we focus, for simplicity, on the case where the intertemporal substitution elasticity
of money does not take unreasonably large values, σa < 2z (see proposition 4 for a related
assumption).
Proposition 10 (B, Money growth policy, φ > 0) Suppose that prices are not perfectly
flexible, φ > 0, and that beginning-of-period money enters the utility function, which satisfies
σa < 2z. Then, under a constant money growth policy the equilibrium displays real determi-
nacy and local stability if but not only if φac < (z− 1)σc. The equilibrium sequences are then
non-oscillatory.
Proof. See appendix 6.10.
As described in proposition 10, a constant money growth policy can ensure local stability
and uniqueness if real balance effects are not too large, φac < (z − 1)σc. In contrast to the
corresponding case with flexible prices (see proposition 4), current inflation can – due to
sticky prices – be determined, implying that beginning-of-period real balances now serve as
a relevant state variable. Thus, local stability demands a stable eigenvalue, which requires
the equilibrium sequence of real balances to be positively related to inflation, since constant
money growth implies a negative inflation feedback. Even in the presence of the above
mentioned negative partial impact of real balances on current inflation via the aggregate
supply relation (20), such a positive relation arises if the real balance effect is not extremely
large. In this case, for which φac < (z−1)σc is sufficient, local stability and uniqueness arises.
This, will be discussed in more detail in the last part of this section.
4.2 End-of-period money
Next, we examine the E-version where the end-of-period stock of money enters the utility
function. The main difference to the former case can immediately be seen from the following
24Note that if σl = 0, the threshold −ρπ3 reduces to the term 1 + 2(1+β)χ , which also serves as an upper
bound for the inflation elasticity in the corresponding model with a separable utility function (see Carlstrom
and Fuerst, 2001).
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set of linearized equilibrium conditions (see definition 3):
π̂t − βEtπ̂t+1 = χ [(σl + σc) ĉt − εcam̂t]− χ (1 + σl) ŝt, (23)
σcĉt − εcam̂t = σcEtĉt+1 − εcaEtm̂t+1 − R̂t + Etπ̂t+1, (24)
(εca + σa) m̂t = (φac + σc) ĉt − (z − 1) R̂t. (25)
The conditions (23)-(25) together with the transversality condition and a monetary policy
rule (16) have to be satisfied by sequences {ĉt, π̂t, m̂t, R̂t}∞t=0 for {ŝt}∞t=0 and a given initial
value m̂−1. As beginning-of-period real balances do not enter the set of equilibrium condi-
tions (23)-(25), the solution does, evidently, not depend on the realizations of a predetermined
variable unless policy is history dependent. Put differently, the households’ behavior is en-
tirely forward looking such that history dependence can only be due to monetary policy. The
following proposition summarizes the local equilibrium properties for both interest rate rules.
Proposition 11 (E, Interest rate policy, φ > 0) Suppose that prices are not perfectly flex-
ible, φ > 0, that end-of-period money enters the utility function, and that the central bank
sets the nominal interest rate.
1. When current inflation serves as the indicator, R̂t = ρππ̂t, the equilibrium displays real
determinacy and local stability if and only if ρπ > 1.
2. When future inflation serves as the indicator, R̂t = ρπEtπ̂t+1, the equilibrium dis-
plays real determinacy and local stability if and only if 1 < ρπ < min {ρπ4, ρπ5} or
max{1, ρπ4} < ρπ < ρπ5, where ρπ4 ≡ βΥχσlεca(z−1) ≥ 0 and ρπ5 ≡
Υ(2+2β+χ)+χσl(σa+εca)
χσl((2z−1)εca+σa)+χΥ ≥
0, for σl > 0, and ρπ ∈ (1, 1 + 2(1 + β)/χ) for σl = 0.
Proof. See appendix 6.11.
According to proposition 11, active interest rate setting is necessary (but not sufficient) for
real determinacy.25 When the central bank applies a forward looking rule, it should not raise
the interest rate too aggressively with inflation (see part 2 of proposition 11).26 Thus, non-
separability does for the E-version not lead to a fundamental deviation from the principles
for equilibrium determinacy in the corresponding model with a separable utility function.
Compared to the latter case (see, e.g., Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2001, or Woodford, 2003),
the conditions for real determinacy under a forward looking interest rate rule are, however,
more restrictive under non-separable preferences. In the special case where the labor supply
elasticity is infinite, σl = 0, the conditions for both cases are identical.27
Now suppose that the central bank applies a constant money growth rule. Then, the model
exhibits a relevant state variable, even though the households’ behavior is entirely forward
25The condition for real determinacy in part 1 accords to the determinacy conditions in Benhabib et al.’s
(2001b) analysis of a continuous time framework, which relates to an end-of-period specification, and in
Kurozumi (2004), who applies a Taylor-type interest rate rule featuring current inflation and the output gap.
26Non-emptiness of the sets (1, min {ρπ4, ρπ5}) and (max{1, ρπ4}, ρπ5) requires, εca < βΥ[χσl(z − 1)]−1,
and, respectively, βΥ[χσl(z − 1)]−1 < εca < Υ(1 + β)[χσl(z − 1)]−1, if ρπ4 < 1.
27For σl = 0, ρπ ∈ (1, 1 + 2(1 + β)/χ) is necessary and sufficient for local stability and uniqueness of the
E-version, while it leads to unstable equilibrium sequences in the B-version (see proposition 9).
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looking. History dependence of the equilibrium sequences is thus induced by monetary policy.
It should be noted that this property crucially relies on prices to be sticky. In contrast, a
money growth policy cannot not induce a history dependence under perfectly flexible prices
(see proposition 7).
Proposition 12 (E, Money growth policy, φ > 0) Suppose that prices are not perfectly
flexible, φ > 0, and that end-of-period money enters the utility function. Then, under a
constant money growth policy, the equilibrium displays real determinacy, and the equilibrium
sequences are locally stable and non-oscillatory.
Proof. See appendix 6.12.
According to proposition 12, a constant money growth policy guarantees local stability and
uniqueness in the E-version. In contrast to the B-version (see proposition 10), this result
is ensured without any further restriction. It should be noted that εcaφac < σcσa, which
is ensured by the assumptions (3)-(4), is crucial for the results in proposition 10 and 12.
To be more precise, local stability and uniqueness for both timing specifications rely on
the assumption that the utility function is strictly concave in consumption and real money
balances.
4.3 Discussion
In contrast to the case where prices are flexible, beginning-of-period real balances always
serve as a relevant determinant for current consumption in the B-version. Nonetheless,
the conditions for locally stable, unique, and non-oscillatory equilibrium sequences under
interest rate policy unveil the same principles: Whenever real money serves as a relevant
predetermined state variable, interest rate policy should be passive to avoid macroeconomic
instability (see propositions 8-9). In the E-version, however, beginning-of-period real balances
are irrelevant and interest rate policy must be active for real determinacy (see proposition
11).
To get an intuition how money demand affects the local dynamics, suppose that the
real balance effect is small (low εca) and that the economy is hit by a temporary negative
productivity shock, ŝt < 0, which induces a rise in current inflation by the aggregate supply
relation. For a positive inflation elasticity, ρπ > 0, the nominal interest rate rises, causing
households to reduce their end-of-period real balances mt by (22) for the B-version as well
as by (25) for the E-version. According to (21) as well as (24), higher nominal and real
interest rates are associated with a rise in the growth rate of consumption and a decline in
the growth rate of real balances.28 For the E-version, the rise in the nominal interest rate has
to induce consumption to grow strong enough such that the growth rate of real balances is
also positive and consistent with the consumption Euler equation. Then, consumption ĉt and
real balances m̂t decline on impact in return to the steady state from below in the subsequent
period. Thereby, activeness, ρπ > 1, ensures that the real interest rate does not decline, ruling
out real indeterminacy, as in a version without real balance effects (see Woodford, 2003).
28According to the real balance effect, a decline in the marginal utility of consumption, can either be brought
about by an increase in consumption, or by an decrease in real balances.
20
If, however, the beginning-of-period stock of money enters the utility function, the rise
in the real interest rate is associated with a decline in (m̂t − m̂t−1), causing end-of-period
real balances m̂t to decline, given that the beginning-of-period amount of real balances is
predetermined (see 21). Thus, m̂t declines due to the consumption Euler equation (21) and
the money demand condition (22). This, however, further feeds the inflationary pressure,
as can be seen from the aggregate supply constraint (20), where real balances enter with a
negative coefficient. As a consequence, the contractionary effect of a rise in the nominal and
in the real interest rate is perpetuated, giving rise to equilibrium sequences diverging from
the steady state. If, however, interest rate policy is passive, real balances tend to grow with
the decline in the real interest rate by (21), implying a convergence back to the steady state.
Our results in proposition 10 and 12 indicate that constant money growth ensures locally
stable, unique, and non-oscillatory equilibrium sequences for small real balance effects in
both versions. To see how this policy rule affects the local dynamics, suppose again that
a contractionary productivity shock causes inflation to be higher than in the steady state.
According to the constant money growth rule, real balances must decrease. Since real balances
and consumption are Edgeworth-complements, households tend to reduce consumption, such
that the nominal interest rate and the real interest rate rise due to the consumption Euler
equation, (21) or (24). Now recall that the aggregate supply relation (20) or (23) predicts that
real balances and consumption affect the current inflation rate in opposite ways: Consumption
tends to increase and real money balances tend to decrease current inflation to the extent
εcaχ. Thus, inflation can only rise if there is a sufficiently large real balance effect, measured
by εca. Yet, real balance effects are – through our assumptions of a strictly concave utility
function (4) – ensured to be sufficiently small such that the decline in consumption indeed
governs the inflation response. Thus, the real value of money can subsequently rise due to
the decline in inflation, such that the equilibrium sequence of real balances converges to its
steady state value.
It should finally be noted that if the utility function is assumed to be separable, our
model would reproduce the conventional determinacy results under interest rate rules (see
Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2001, or Woodford, 2003): When the central bank follows an interest
rate rule featuring current inflation then an active interest rate setting is necessary and
sufficient for macroeconomic stability. If the central bank follows a forward looking interest
rate rule, activeness is necessary but not sufficient for locally stable and unique equilibrium
sequences. To be more precise, ρπ ∈ (1, 1+2σc(1+β)[χ(σl+σc)]−1) ensures local stability and
uniqueness. If the monetary authority controls the supply of money then 2z > σa is sufficient
for locally stable and unique equilibrium sequences if beginning-of-period money provides
utility. Finally, if the stock at the end of the period delivers utility then a constant money
growth regime ensures local stability and uniqueness.29 Thus, macroeconomic stability is
likely to be ensured by a constant money growth policy, regardless of real balance effects, or
if prices are flexible or sticky.
29A similar conclusion is drawn by Evans and Honkapohja (2003) from their numerical analysis of real
determinacy under money growth policy in a sticky price model.
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5 Conclusion
Real balance effects typically arise when transaction costs are specified in a general equilib-
rium model in form of shopping time or real resource costs, which are reduced by money
holdings. The fact that the equilibrium sequences for real balances and consumption can
then not separately be determined, is broadly viewed as negligible for the assessment of
monetary policy, given that empirical evidence suggests real balance effects to be relatively
small. In contrast to this view, it is demonstrated in this paper that the existence (not the
magnitude) of real balance effects can have substantial implications for the determination of
a rational expectations equilibrium and of the price level under interest rate policy. However,
for real balance effects to contribute to price level determination, as for example suggested
by Patinkin (1965), the stock of money held at the beginning of the period rather than held
at the end of the period has to be assumed to provide transaction services. Then, there
exists a unique initial price level that is consistent with a rational expectations equilibrium,
i.e., the equilibrium displays nominal determinacy. Whenever the price level can uniquely
be determined, real money serves as a relevant state variable, since money that has been
acquired in the previous period relates to the households’ current consumption expenditures.
These properties, which have until now been ignored in the literature, crucially affect the
conditions that ensure macroeconomic stability under interest rate feedback rules regardless
whether prices are flexible or sticky. If, on the other hand, current consumption is related to
the end-of-period stock of money, then the equilibrium displays nominal indeterminacy, and
the well-known principles for uniqueness and stability of equilibrium sequences of a cashless
economy (roughly) apply.
While the particular determinacy conditions for macroeconomic stability are highly sen-
sitive under an interest rate policy regime, equilibrium uniqueness and stability is likely to
be ensured by a constant money growth policy. This suggests that a central bank that aims
to avoid multiple, unstable, or oscillatory equilibrium sequences in an environment where
transaction frictions are non-negligible, should rather control the supply of money than the
nominal interest rate. Yet, an optimal conduct of monetary policy will certainly require the
supply of money to be state contingent (as an interest rate feedback rule), which might be
associated with different determinacy implications than a constant money growth regime.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Equivalence between explicit transaction frictions and money-in-the-
utility-function
In this appendix we examine the relation between the money-in-the-utility-function spec-
ification, which is applied throughout the paper, and explicit specifications of transaction
frictions, i.e., a shopping time specification and a specification where transactions are associ-
ated with real resource costs. For this demonstration, which relates to the analyses in Brock
(1974) and Feenstra (1986), we assume, for convenience, that prices are flexible, φ = 0. For





βtυ (ct, xt) , υc > 0, υcc < 0, υx > 0, υcx = 0, and υxx ≤ 0, (26)
where x denotes leisure.
1. We firstly consider a conventional shopping time specification which relates to the one
applied in Brock (1974), McCallum and Goodfriend (1987), or Ljungqvist and Sargent
(2000). For this we assume that households have to allocate total time endowment,
which is normalized to equal one, to leisure x, working time l, and shopping time s,
where the shopping time is assumed to depend on the consumption expenditures and
on real balances
1 ≥ xt + lt + st, where st = H(ct, At/Pt).
Following Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000), we assume that the shopping time function H
satisfies: Hc > 0, Hcc > 0, Ha < 0, and Haa > 0 and Hca ≤ 0. Using that xt = 1− lt−st
holds in the household’s optimum, we can rewrite the utility function as
u(ct, lt, at) = υ (ct, 1− lt −H(ct, at)) ,
where uc = υc + υx(−Hc) Q 0, ua = υx(−Ha) > 0, ul = −υx < 0, ucc = υcc + υxxH2c −
υxHcc < 0, ucl = υxxHc ≤ 0, uaa = υxxH2a − υxHaa < 0, ual = υxxHa ≥ 0, as well as
ull = υxx. Hence, the marginal utility of consumption, which is given by
uca = υxxHaHc − υxHca,
is non-decreasing in real balances. If the shopping time function is non-separable or if
leisure enters the utility function in a non-linear way, then marginal utility of consump-
tion is strictly increasing in real balances.
2. Next, we closely follow the analysis in Feenstra (1986), and assume that purchases
of consumption goods are associated with real resource costs of transactions φ(ct, at),
which satisfy: φ ≥ 0, φ(0, a) = 0, φc > 0, φa < 0, φcc ≥ 0, φaa ≥ 0, φac ≤ 0. The
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household’s budget constraint then reads
Mt+Bt+Et[qt,t+1Zt+1]+Ptφ(ct, at)+Ptct ≤ Rt−1Bt−1+Zt+Mt−1+Ptwtlt+Ptωt−Ptτt.
(27)
Maximizing (26) subject to (27), a no-Ponzi game condition, and xt ≤ 1 − lt, leads –
inter alia – to the following first order conditions for consumption and leisure:
λrt(1 + φc(ct, at)) = υc(ct), λrtwt = υx(1− lt),
where λrt denotes the Lagrange multiplier on (27). Note that the aggregate resource
constraint now reads yt = ct + φ(ct, at). Using the linear production technology, we
therefore obtain the following equilibrium condition: lt = ct+φ(ct, at). Combining these
conditions and using that wt = (ε − 1)/ε under flexible prices, leads to the following
expression for the marginal utility of consumption:
υc(ct) =
ε
ε− 1υx(1− ct − φ(ct, at))(1 + φc(ct, at)).
Evidently, the equilibrium sequence of consumption is in general not independent from





ε/(ε− 1)[υxφca − υxx(1 + φc)φa]
υcc + ε/(ε− 1)[(1 + φc)2υxx − φccυx] .
Hence, consumption is positively related to real balances even if either the cross-
derivative φca vanishes or the labor supply elasticity is infinite, i.e. υxx = 0.
The corresponding properties of our MIU specification immediately show that an equivalence
between the latter and the shopping time specification in 1. requires consumption and real
balances to be Edgeworth-complements in the MIU version, if υxx < 0 or Hca < 0. In order
to compare the MIU specification with the transaction cost specification in 2., we apply the
first order condition for consumption and labor, the aggregate resource constraint, and the
production function, which imply that the equilibrium sequence of consumption under a MIU
specification satisfies dct/dat = −uca(ucc + ε/(ε−1)ull)−1. Evidently, an equivalence between
both specifications requires consumption and real balances to be Edgeworth-complements,
i.e. uca > 0, if φca < 0 or υxx < 0. Thus, υxx < 0, which implies a finite labor supply elasticity
is sufficient for the existence of real balance effects under both specifications of transaction
frictions.
6.2 Existence and uniqueness of the steady state
In this appendix, we briefly examine globally the steady state properties of the model.
Thereby, we restrict our attention to the case where the nominal interest rate is strictly
positive, R − 1 > 0. We further omit, for convenience, bars which are throughout the paper
used to mark steady state values.
When the stock of money at the beginning of the period enters the utility function, the de-
terministic steady state is characterized by the following conditions: −ul(c) = uc(c, m/π)(ε−
1)/ε, R = π/β and ua(c,m/π)(uc(c, m/π))−1 = R − 1. For an interest rate policy regime, it
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is assumed that the policy rule of the central bank, R(π), has a unique solution for the steady
state relation R = π/β, so that the inflation rate can be substituted out. The first equation
implies that c is an implicit function of m, c = f(m), with f ′(m) = −uca(ε − 1)[Rβε(ull +
ucc(ε−1)/ε)]−1 > 0. Using this, the third equation can be used to determine the steady state
value for m with ua(f(m),m/π)[uc(f(m),m/(Rβ))]−1 = R − 1. Differentiating the fraction




uc(ε− 1)/ε(uccuaa − u2ca) + ull(uaauc − uauca)
Rβu2c(ull + ucc(ε− 1)/ε)
< 0,







Thus, steady state uniqueness relies on money to be essential (see Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1983):
The marginal utility of real money balances should grow with a rate that is higher than the
rate by which 1/uc converges to zero when m approaches zero. An analogous line of arguments
in case of a money growth policy leads to the condition limm→0 ua(g(m),m/µ)[uc(g(m),m/µ)]−1 >
µ/β − 1, where c = g(m) is the implicit relation derived of the steady state condition
−ul(c) = uc(c,m/µ) with g′(m) = −uca(ε − 1)[µε(ull + ucc(ε − 1)/ε)]−1 > 0. The condi-
tion for existence and uniqueness for the interest rate policy regime if end-of-period money









with fE(m)′ = −uca(ε − 1)[ε(ull + ucc(ε − 1)/ε)]−1 > 0. If the monetary authority applies a
constant money growth rule then limm→0 ua(fE(m),m)[uc(fE(m),m)]−1 > (µ/β − 1)/(µ/β)
must be satisfied.
6.3 Proof of proposition 2
Consider a monetary policy regime that sets the nominal interest rate contingent on changes
in current inflation, R̂t = ρππ̂t. Reducing the model in (13)-(15) leads to the following system



























The characteristic polynomial of A can be simplified to
F (X) = X2 −Xρπ Υ + σl(εca + σa)− zσlεcaΥ + σl(εca + σa) −
ρπzσlεca
Υ + σl(εca + σa)
.
Consider the case the labor supply elasticity is finite σl > 0. In this case, the determinant of
A, det(A) = F (0) < 0, is strictly negative, indicating that exactly one eigenvalue is negative
and that real money balances are a relevant state variable. Local stability and uniqueness
then requires that there exists exactly one root of F (X) = 0 with modulus less than one. To
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examine the conditions for this, we use that F (X) further satisfies
F (1) = 1− ρπ,
F (−1) = (1 + ρπ)(Υ + σl(εca + σa))− 2zσlεcaρπ
Υ + σl(εca + σa)
.
Thus, for F (1) < 0 (> 0) and F (−1) > 0 (< 0), the model is locally stable, unique and
(non-)oscillatory, since the stable eigenvalue is negative (positive). Suppose that the real
balance effect and that the inverse of the labor supply elasticity are large enough such
that εca > σa(2z − 1)−1 and σl > σl, where σl ≡ Υ(2z−1)εca−σa . Then, F (−1) can be
negative if ρπ is sufficiently large. Local stability and uniqueness with F (1) > 0 and
F (−1) < 0, is then ensured by moderate inflation elasticities satisfying ρπ1 < ρπ < 1, where
ρπ1 ≡ σl(εca+σa)+Υσl(2z−1)εca−σlσa−Υ . Alternatively, local stability and uniqueness arise for F (1) < 0 and
F (−1) > 0, which requires 1 < ρπ < ρπ1. Suppose that εca > σa(2z − 1)−1 or σl < σl. Then,
F (−1) cannot be negative and local stability and uniqueness then arise if ρπ > 1.
Now, consider the case where the labor supply elasticity is infinite, σl = 0. In this case
det(A) = 0, indicating that the beginning-of-period value for real money balances is irrelevant
for the determination of π̂t and m̂t. It follows that one eigenvalue equals zero and the other
eigenvalue is larger than one, if and only if ρπ > 1. Then, the equilibrium sequences for m̂t,
Etĉt+1, π̂t and R̂t for t ≥ 0 are locally stable and uniquely determined, while ĉt cannot be
determined. ¥
6.4 Proof of proposition 3
Consider a monetary regime in which future inflation serves as the policy indicator, R̂t =
ρπEtπ̂t+1. Substituting for consumption with (13) and inserting the forward-looking feedback



























The characteristic polynomial of A is given by
F (X) = X(X − ρπzσlεca
(Υ + σl(εca + σa))(1− ρπ) + ρπzσlεca ).
Evidently, real money balances are not a relevant state variable, and one can only solve for
m̂t, Etπ̂t+1, Etĉt+1 and R̂t ∀t ≥ 0. For a finite labor supply elasticity, σl > 0, local stability
and uniqueness requires the other eigenvalue (one is equal to zero) to be unstable. A positive
unstable root arises if monetary policy is active and σl > σl2 or if 1 < ρπ < ρπ2 for σl < σl2 or
εca < σa/(2z − 1). A negative unstable root exists if ρπ > ρπ2, given that σl > σl and εca >
σa/(2z − 1), for σl < σl2 or εca < σa/(2z − 1). Thus, 1 < ρπ2 < ρπ < −ρπ1 leads to a locally
stable and unique equilibrium with a negative root for σl < σl or εca < σa/(2z−1). When the
labor supply elasticity is infinite, σl = 0, then the Euler equation reads (1− ρπ)Etπ̂t+1 = 0.
Thus, the model displays local stability and uniqueness if and only if ρπ 6= 1. ¥
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6.5 Proof of proposition 4
Under a constant money growth regime the nominal interest rate can be substituted out
so that the reduced form system of the model in (13)-(15) reads (where we omitted the
exogenous state)
$1Et[ĉt+1]− ($2 + 1) m̂t + $2Et[π̂t+1] = −σcĉt + εcam̂t−1 − εcaπ̂t, (28)
εcam̂t−1 = (σl + σc) ĉt + εcaπ̂t, (29)
where $1 ≡ (σc(1− z) + φac) z−1 and $2 ≡ (εca(1− z)− z + σa) z−1, and m̂t = m̂t−1 − π̂t.
After eliminating consumption with (29) and inflation with the linearized money growth rule
(16), we get the following difference equation in m̂t :
Etm̂t+1 =
z(σlεca + σl + σc)
z(σlεca + σl + σc)− (Υ + σlεca + σlσa)m̂t.
Once m̂t is determined, which requires an unstable root, one can solve for π̂t and ĉt ∀t ≥ 1,
while the initial values for consumption ĉ0 and inflation π̂0 cannot be determined. Local
uniqueness and stability of the equilibrium sequences {m̂t, π̂t+1, ĉt+1, R̂t}∞t=0 thus require∣∣∣ z(σlεca+σl+σc)z(σlεca+σl+σc)−(Υ+σlεca+σlσa)
∣∣∣ > 1. If z(σlεca + σl + σc) − (Υ + σlεca + σlσa) > 0, then
the root is positive and unstable. Rearranging and using Υ = σcσa − εcaφac shows that this
conditions is satisfied for z > σa. ¥
6.6 Proof of proposition 6
Consider the case where the central bank sets the nominal interest rate contingent on changes
in current inflation, R̂t = ρππ̂t. After substituting for consumption and eliminating m̂t
and m̂t+1 with the static money demand equation (19), one obtains the following difference
equation (where we omitted the exogenous state):
(d + 1)ρππ̂t = (dρπ + 1)Etπ̂t+1,
where d ≡ (z − 1)σlεca[Υ + σl(εca + σa)]−1 > 0. Therefore ρπ > 1 is necessary and sufficient
for local stability and uniqueness of the equilibrium sequences of inflation π̂t, real balances
m̂t, consumption ĉt and the nominal interest rate, R̂t ∀ t ≥ 0.
Now, consider the case where future inflation serves as the policy indicator, R̂t = ρπEtπ̂t+1.
When the labor supply elasticity is finite, σl > 0, then the model in (17)-(19) reduces to:
Etπ̂t+2 =
ρπ(1 + d)− 1
dρπ
Etπ̂t+1.
Evidently, one cannot determine current inflation rate π̂t. One obtains a unique and locally
stable solution for expected inflation, and the current values of consumption, real money
balances and the nominal interest rate, if the eigenvalue of this equation is positive and
unstable, which requires ρπ > 1. Alternatively, ρπ < [1 + 2d]−1 ensures local stability and
uniqueness, where one eigenvalue is smaller than −1. When the labor supply elasticity is
infinite, σl = 0, then uniqueness of a equilibrium sequence for Etπ̂t+1 ∀t ≥ 0 is guaranteed
by ρπ 6= 1.¥
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6.7 Proof of proposition 7
Under a constant money growth policy, m̂t = m̂t−1 − π̂t, the model in (17)-(19) can – by
eliminating the nominal interest rate – be reduced to (where we omitted the exogenous state):
εcam̂t = (σl + σc) ĉt, (30)




where γ1 = σc(z − 1)z−1 > 0, γ2 = (1 + εca)(z − 1)z−1 > 0 and γ3 = (εca + σa)z−1 > 0.
Eliminating consumption with (30) and inflation with the linearized money growth rule leads
to the following difference equation in real money balances:
Etm̂t+1 =
[σl(1 + εca) + σc](z − 1) + Υ + σl(εca + σa)
[σl(1 + εca) + σc](z − 1) m̂t,
which evidently exhibits an unstable root. Thus, one can uniquely determine end-of-period
real balances m̂t , current consumption ĉt, the nominal interest rate R̂t ∀t ≥ 0, while inflation
π̂t can only be determined for t ≥ 1 . ¥
6.8 Proof of proposition 8
When current inflation enters the reaction function of the central bank, R̂t = ρππ̂t, then the



















−εca − σa εca + σa σc + φac





χεca 1− χεca−χ (σl + σc)
0 zρπ 0
−εca ρπ + εca σc

 .
The characteristic polynomial of the matrix A reads
F (X) = X3 −X2 Υ(1 + β + χ) + σlχ(εca + σa)
βΥ
+ X






The value of F (X) at X = 0, which is given by F (0) = zσlρπχεcaβΥ ≥ 0, discloses that F (0) > 0
if σl > 0 and F (0) = 0 if σl = 0. Hence, for σl > 0 the model either exhibits one or three
negative roots, as det(A) = −F (0) < 0. Continuing the analysis for this case (σl > 0), the
value of F (X) at X = 1, given by
F (1) =
(ρπ − 1)χ(Υ + σl(εca + σa))
βΥ
,
reveals that locally stable, unique, and non-oscillatory equilibrium sequences necessarily re-
quire ρπ < 1. In order to rule out any further stable root for this case, we examine F (X) at
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X = −1,
F (−1) = σl (2zχρπεca − χεca − χρπσa − χρπεca − χσa)−Υ(2β + χ + χρπ + 2)
Υβ
,
Suppose that (2z − 1)εca > σa. Then, F (−1) < 0 requires, σl > σl = Υ(2z−1)εca−σa , and
ρπ > ρπ3 ≡ σlχ(εca+σa)+Υ(2β+χ+2)χ[σl(2z−1)εca−σlσa−Υ] , which implies that the negative root is smaller than minus
one. If ρπ > ρπ3, and σl > σl, we know that F (−1) > 0, such that the two remaining roots
are unstable and the equilibrium is locally stable and unique. Since the unstable roots are of
opposite sign, there cannot exist a pair of complex roots in this case.
If ρπ > 1, local stability and uniqueness require F (−1) to be negative, implying that
there is a stable root between minus one and zero, i.e. an oscillatory equilibrium path. Then,




if σl < σl. If








⇒ det(A) < −1, a pair of stable roots (either complex or real) cannot exist,
since they would necessarily lead to a determinant with an absolute value that is smaller
than one. Thus, there exists exactly one stable eigenvalue. Until now we assumed that
(2z − 1)εca > σa. If 0 < (2z − 1)εca < σa then no non-oscillatory equilibrium exists, and the





If σl = 0, the characteristic polynomial reduces to F (X)|σl=0 = (1−X+X2β−Xχ−Xβ+
χρπ)Xβ . Hence, one root equals zero and the remaining roots are given by X
2 − χ+β+1β X +
1+χρπ
β = 0. As F (0) =
1+χρπ
β > 0, F
′(1) = −1−β+χβ < 0, and F (1) = χρπ−1β , activeness,
ρπ > 1, is then necessary and sufficient for local stability and uniqueness. ¥
6.9 Proof of proposition 9
Applying the linearized forward looking interest rate rule, R̂t = ρπEtπ̂t+1 and eliminating
consumption, the model in (20)-(22) reads (where we omitted the exogenous state)
φ2π̂t = βEtπ̂t+1 + φ1m̂t−1, (32)
φ3m̂t − φ5Etπ̂t+1 = φ3m̂t−1 − φ4π̂t, (33)
where φ1 ≡ χκ−1 [Υ + σl (εca + σa)] > 0, φ2 ≡ 1 + φ1 − χκ−1 (σl + σc) zρπ, φ3 ≡ Υκ−1 > 0,
φ4 ≡ φ3 − σcκ−1zρπ, φ5 ≡ φ4 − (1− ρπ), κ ≡ σc + φac > 0, and Υ ≡ σcσa − εcaφac > 0.






















The characteristic polynomial of A is given by






Given that det(A) = F (0) = β−1Υ−1 (Υ + zχρπσlεca) > 1, two stable roots and thus in-
determinacy can be ruled out. The value of F (X) at X = 1, which is given by F (1) =
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χΥ+σaσl+σlεcaβΥ (ρπ − 1), further reveals that ρπ < 1 is necessary and sufficient for F (1) < 0
and thus for the existence of exactly one stable root, which lies between zero and one. Local
stability and uniqueness can, however, also be ensured by an active policy ρπ > 1 if F (X) at
X = −1, which is given by
F (−1) = 1
βΥ
[Υ (2 + 2β + χ) + χσl (σa + εca) + ρπχ (σl ((2z − 1) εca − σa)−Υ)] ,
is negative, such that there is exactly one stable root between minus one and zero. This,
necessarily requires σl ((2z − 1) εca − σa) < Υ and ρπ > χσl(σa+εca)+Υ(2+2β+χ)χ(σl(1−2z)εca+σlσa+Υ) = −ρπ3, and
leads to oscillatory equilibrium sequences. ¥
6.10 Proof of proposition 10
Eliminating the nominal interest rate and applying the linearized money growth rule (16),
the model in (20-(22) reads (where we omitted the exogenous state)
$1Etĉt+1 − [$2 + 1] m̂t + $2Etπ̂t+1 = −σcĉt + εcam̂t−1 − εcaπ̂t, (34)
π̂t = χ [(σl + σc) ĉt − εcam̂t−1 + εcaπ̂t] + βEtπ̂t+1, (35)
m̂t = m̂t−1 − π̂t, (36)
where $1 ≡ (σc(1− z) + φac) z−1 and $2 ≡ (εca(1− z)− z + σa) z−1. The model in (34)-




































The characteristic polynomial of A can be reduced to:
F (X) = X3 −X2 $1(1 + β − χεca)− βσc + $2χ(σc + σl)
$1β






In order to disclose the conditions for local stability and uniqueness, we examine F (X) at
X = 0 and X = 1. Using that F (0) is given by F (0) = −zσcβ−1 ((z − 1)σc − φac)−1, we can
conclude that F (0) < −1 ⇔ φac < (z − 1) σc. The latter condition further ensures F (X) at
X = 1, which is given by
F (1) = χ
σl (σa + εac) + Υ
β ((z − 1)σc − φac) ,
to be positive, F (1) > 0 ⇔ φac < (z − 1) σc. In this case, there exists at least one stable
root, X1 ∈ (0, 1), and, as det(A) = −F (0) > 1, at least one of the remaining two roots must
be unstable. Thus, there cannot exist another (real or complex) stable eigenvalue (see proof
of proposition 8). In order to ensure that both remaining roots are unstable, F (X) has to be
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negative at X = −1, provided that φac < (z − 1)σc. Since F (−1) is given by
F (−1) = − 1
β ((z − 1)σc − φac)
[
(2z − σa) χ (σc + σl) + (z − 1) (2σc + 2βσc + χσlεca)
+ (zσc − φac) (2 + 2β) + χεca (φac + zσl)
]
,
we can conclude that F (−1) < 0 and that the model is locally stable and unique, given that
σa < 2z and φac < (z − 1) σc. ¥
6.11 Proof of proposition 11
We start with the case where the nominal interest rate is set contingent on current inflation,
R̂t = ρππ̂t. Reducing the model (23)-(25) into a two-dimensional system in inflation and








1 + $bρπ σc −$a
)−1 (
(1− χ$bρπ)−χ (σl + σc) + χ$a











where $a = εca φac+σcεca+σa > 0, $b = εca
z−1
εca+σa
> 0. The characteristic polynomial of the matrix
A, can be simplified to
F (X) = X2−X Υ(1 + β + χ) + χσl(σa + εca + (z − 1)ρπεca)
βΥ
+
Υ(1 + χρπ) + χρπσl(σa + zεca)
βΥ
.
with det(A) = F (0) = Υ(1+χρπ)+χρπσl(σa+zεca)βΥ > 1. Hence, local stability and uniqueness are
ensured if F (X) is positive at X = 1,−1. While F (X) is, regardless of interest rate policy,
strictly positive at X = −1,
F (−1) = Υ(2 + 2β + χ + χρπ) + χσl(σa + εca + ρπσl + (2z − 1)ρπεca)
βΥ
> 0,
the value for F (X) at X = 1, which is given by F (1) = (ρπ − 1)χΥ+σlσa+σlεcaβΥ , is positive if
interest rate policy satisfies ρπ > 1. Hence, the equilibrium sequences are for σl ≥ 0 locally
stable and unique if and only if ρπ > 1.
Now, consider the case, where future inflation serves as the indicator for the policy rule,
Rt = ρπEtπt+1. After eliminating inflation with the money demand condition (25), the model
can be reduced to the following 2 × 2 system in real balances and consumption (where we













−χεca − βηa χ (σl + σc) + βηb
−εca σc
)−1 ( −ηa ηb
−(ρπ − 1)ηa − εca (ρπ − 1)ηb + σc
)
.
where ηa = εca+σa(z−1)ρπ > 0 and ηb =
φac+σc
(z−1)ρπ > 0. The characteristic polynomial of A is given
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by:
F (X) = X2 +
Υ
βΥ + (1− z)σlρπεcaχ
−X Υ(1 + β + χ(1− ρπ)) + χσl(σa + εca − σaρπ − zρπεca)
βΥ + (1− z)σlρπεcaχ ,
where det(A) = F (0) = Υ (βΥ− (z − 1)χρπσlεca)−1, implying that F (0) > 1 and that
there is at least one unstable eigenvalue, if ρπ < ρπ4, where ρπ4 ≡ βΥχσlεca(z−1) . Hence,
the equilibrium sequences are locally stable and unique (two unstable roots) when F (X) is
positive at X = 1,−1, provided that ρπ < ρπ4. The value of F (X) at X = 1, which is given
by
F (1) =
(Υ + σaσl + σlεca) (ρπ − 1)χ
βΥ + (1− z)σlρπεcaχ ,
reveals that F (1) > 0 if 1 < ρπ < ρπ4, which rules out the existence of a positive stable root.
To establish that there is no negative stable root, the value for F (X) at X = −1
F (−1) = Υ(2 + 2β + χ) + χσl(σa + εca)− ρπ(χσl(2zεca + σa − εca) + χΥ)
βΥ + (1− z)σlρπεcaχ ,
has to be positive, F (−1) > 0, which is ensured by ρπ < ρπ5, where ρπ5 ≡ Υ(2+2β+χ)+χσl(σa+εca)χσl(2zεca+σa−εca)+χΥ .
Hence, for σl > 0 the model is locally stable and unique if 1 < ρπ < min {ρπ4, ρπ5}. Local sta-
bility and uniqueness, however, is also ensured if F (X) is negative at X = −1, 0, and 1, which
requires max{1, ρπ4} < ρπ < ρπ5. For σl = 0, the condition reads ρπ ∈ (1, 1 + 2(1 + β)/χ). ¥
6.12 Proof of proposition 12
Eliminating the nominal interest rate and applying the linearized money growth rule (16),
the model in (23)-(25) reads
−χεcam̂t + βEtπ̂t+1 = −χ (σl + σc) ĉt + π̂t + χσlŝt, (37)




m̂t = m̂t−1 − π̂t, (39)
where γ1 = σc(z− 1)z−1 > 0, γ2 = (1 + εca)(z− 1)z−1 > 0 and γ3 = (εca + σa)z−1 > 0. Then
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The characteristic polynomial of the matrix A is given by
F (X) = X3 −X2 γ1z(2β + 1− χεca) + β(σc + φac) + χγ2z(σl + σc)
γ1zβ
+ X
γ1z(2 + β − χεca) + (1 + β − χεca)(φac + σc) + (σl + σc)(γ2 + γ3)zχ
γ1zβ
− γ1z + σc + φac
γ1zβ
.
To derive the conditions for local stability and uniqueness, which requires one stable and two
unstable roots, we examine F (X) at X = 0, F (0) = − 1β (1 + 1σc
φac+σc
z−1 ) < −1. As F (X) at
X = 1, which is given by
F (1) = χ[σl(εca + σa) + εcaΥ] (γ1zβ)
−1 > 0,
is strictly positive, there exists one real stable eigenvalue, lying between zero and one. Hence,
there must be at least one unstable eigenvalue, given that det(A) = −F (0) > 1. Thus, the
two remaining (complex or real) roots cannot both be stable. Given that F (X) is strictly
negative at X = −1,
F (−1) = −(4γ1z + 2(φac + σc))(1 + β) + χ[Υ + 2zγ1 + γ2z(σl + σc) + σl(2zγ2 + zγ3)]
γ1zβ
< 0,
the remaining root cannot lie between minus one and zero, indicating that the model is locally
stable and unique. ¥
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